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I am a firm believer in the people. 
If given the truth, they can be depended upon to meet any national crisis. 




Pending publication of this article, the body of Italian PhD student Giulio 
Regeni was discovered in Cairo with signs that he had suffered “inhuman, 
animal-like violence”. Suspecting that Egyptian security forces may have 
been involved, the victim’s family, the media, human rights activists and 
society at large have demanded knowing the truth about the brutal murder 
of the young researcher and identifying and punishing those responsible 
according to law.  
In pursuing the right to the truth, the role of judges is central to ensure 
that acts of torture and other abuses that offend the human conscience 




In two judgments of 24 July 2014, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
unanimously convicted Poland for cooperating in secret transfer and detention 
operations conducted within the US Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) so-called 
“extraordinary renditions” to the detriment of Mr Zayn Al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn 
(also known as Abu Zubaydah) and Mr Abd Al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad Al Nashiri, 
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According to the European Court, the respondent State did not conduct effective 
investigations in violation, inter alia, of Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment) in both its substantive and procedural aspects, Article 5 (right to 
liberty and security), Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and Article 13 
(right to an effective remedy) of the 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Moreover, in failing to comply with the 
obligations to furnish all necessary facilities for its examination of the case as laid down 
in Article 38 of the ECHR, the Polish State wilfully obstructed the ECtHR in the 
objective establishment of the truth
2
. 
The Strasbourg Court’s assessment in these Polish cases echoes the ECtHR Grand 
Chamber’s 2012 El-Masri judgment against the Macedonian Government constituting a 
landmark ruling both in terms of sentencing the participation of a Council of Europe 
member State in secret counterterrorism programs conducted by the CIA and its 
contribution in determining the nature and content of the “right to the truth”. Notably, 
failing to ensure the adequate transparency of the serious violations of human rights 
suffered by Khaled El-Masri (secret detention, torture, ill treatment), Macedonia 
deprived the applicant and other victims of similar offenses as well as the general public 
of “the right to know what had happened”
3
. 
When the ECtHR is faced with such arbitrary, persistent, cruel and gross human rights 
abuses that offend the conscience of humanity and while maintaining the ECHR’s rule-
of-law standards, it is also guided by broader principles regarding the right to the truth 




                                                 
1
 Both Mr Al Nashiri and Mr Husayn alleged that they fell into the category of “High-Value Detainees” 
(HVD) - terrorist suspects likely to be able to provide information on current terrorist threats against the 
United States - against whom the “enhanced interrogation techniques” (EITs) were being used, which 
included the “waterboard technique”, confinement in a box, wall-standing and other stress positions. See 
ECtHR, Case of Al Nashiri v. Poland, Application No. 28761/11, Former Fourth Section, Judgment (July 
24, 2014); ECtHR, Case of Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, Application No. 7511/13, Former Fourth 
Section, Judgment (July 24, 2014). 
2
 In the 2014 Polish cases, the ECtHR also held that there had been a violation of the principles of fair trial 
guaranteed by Article 6 of the ECHR on account of the transfer of the applicant from the respondent 
State’s territory despite the existence of a real risk that he could face a flagrant denial of justice, such as 
the torture evidence. See respectively ECtHR, Case of Al Nashiri and ECtHR, Case of Husayn (Abu 
Zubaydah) cit., paras. 561 et seq., paras. 551 et seq. In the case of Mr Al Nashiri, the Court found that 
Poland also violated Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 by 
having enabled the CIA to transfer him to the jurisdiction of the military commission and thus exposing 
him to a foreseeable serious risk that he could be subjected to the death penalty following his trial. Id., 
paras. 570 et seq. 
3
 ECtHR, Case of El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Application No. 39630/09, 
Grand Chamber, Judgment (Dec. 13, 2012), paras. 191-192. 
4
 ECtHR, Case of Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, Application No. 35343/05, Grand Chamber, Judgment, (Oct. 
20, 2015), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ziemele, para. 27 
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This is clear in cases of “historical sensitivity” where the Strasbourg Court acts as the 
“conscience of Europe” and not pursuing the line of formalistic reasoning
5
 while finding 
itself “at the centre of a complex social process in a society seeking to establish the truth 
about the past and its painful events”
6
. 
Similarly, Inter-American jurisprudence contributed to awakening the world’s 
conscience on mass human rights abuses such as forced disappearances and other ius 
cogens crimes by granting the victims and society at large the right to the truth about 
these violations. More precisely, the right to the truth enabled the Inter-American 
Commission (IAComHR) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) to look 
beyond legal and juridical obstacles in assessing past violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law and consider the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public 
conscience as a suitable interpretative yardstick. 
As this analysis will show, the right to know what happened has been the focus of 
attention of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) since the 1988 
Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras judgment that established the existence of the right of 
the next of kin of victims of enforced disappearance to know their fate and, where 
possible, the location of their remains
7
. The Inter-American Court mainly ascribed such 
right to the right to a fair trial (in particular, the fullest possible procedural ascertainment 
of the historical truth) and the right to judicial protection, enshrined respectively in 




In the November 2010 judgment in the Gomes Lund v. Brazil case, beyond confirming 
the jurisprudence on the “right to know the truth”, IACtHR for the first time identified 




In the case in question, the Court unanimously convicted Brazil for the violations 
committed by the national army during the military regime to the detriment of the 
members of a guerrilla group (extrajudicial acts of torture and executions) considering 
the laws of amnesty approved by the military dictatorship as incompatible with the 
provisions of the American Convention
10
. The Court also expressly excluded that 
reasons of public interest and national security could justify denial of access to 
information relevant to seeking the historical truth
11
. According to the San José judges, 
in denying and/or delaying access to important military archives and other information 




                                                 
5 
ECtHR, Case of Lambert and Others v. France, Application No. 46043/14, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 
(Oct. 20, 2015), Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Villiger, Power-Forde, Pinto De Albuquerque and 
Kūris, para. 18. 
6
 ECtHR, Case of Lambert and Others v. France, Application No. 46043/14, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 
(Oct. 20, 2015), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ziemele, para. 27. 
7
 IACtHR, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment (July 29, 1988), para. 181. 
8
 IACtHR, Case of Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgment (Nov. 25, 2000), para. 201. 
9
 IACtHR, Case of Gomes Lund et al. (“Guerrilha Do Araguaia”) v. Brazil, Judgment (Nov. 24, 2010), 
para. 196 ss. 
10
 Id., para. 325. 
11
 Id., para. 202. 
12
 Id., para. 212. 
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The Gomes Lund case provided IACtHR with the opportunity to establish a series of 
guiding principles on access to information on serious violations of human rights and to 
remark on the individual and collective nature of the right to the truth, examining its 
judicial-procedural and historical-cultural dimensions.  
These guidelines, together with the more recent Strasbourg case-law, have contributed to 
the evolution of the right to the truth, developing a synergistic relationship between the 
systems of enforcement of human rights and repression of crimes. Notably, the growing 
body of ECtHR and IACtHR jurisprudence guaranteeing access to information (and 
judicial remedies) on grave human rights abuses has directed both international and 
internal judiciary to overcome the legal or de facto obstacles standing in the way of 
prosecuting those responsible for grave violations that affect society as a whole.  
Thus, jurisprudential assessments on the right to the truth of victims, their families and 
the larger society provided a type of “historical imprescriptibility”
13
 responding to the 
“profound human need to acknowledge” past suffering offending the human conscience 
and “press for accountability as a means of building for the future”
14
. 
Moving from the recognition of truth as a right in the international arena (section II) and 
further exploring the reconstruction and evolution of the right to the truth in the case-law 
of the international human rights courts
15
 (sections III and IV), the following analysis 
focuses on these ECtHR and IACtHR insights in a comparative perspective
16
 (section V) 
to conclude on the emerging trends of the Strasbourg Court and the Court of San José to 
interpret and apply the right to the truth, acting as the “conscience” of the whole of 
humanity (section VI). 
 
2.- Principles of Humanity, Dictates of Public Conscience and Recognition of Truth 
as a Right in the International Arena 
First affirmed in the “Martens Clause” included in the preamble to the Hague 
Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the “principles of humanity” 
and “dictates of public conscience” concepts have been reiterated in humanitarian law 
instruments, international jurisprudence and international criminal tribunal statutes and 
increasingly associated with grave violations of human rights, acts of genocide and other 
atrocities that offend the human conscience.  
Towards the middle of the 70s, the General Assembly of the Organization of American 
States expressly declared the practice of disappearances as “an affront to the conscience 
of the Hemisphere”. In the same period, with resolution 3220 of 1974, the United 
Nations General Assembly recognized the lack of information on the disappearance or 
death of persons in the course of hostilities as one of the most tragic consequences of 
                                                 
13
 A. De Baets, Historical Imprescriptibility, in Storia della Storiografia/History of Historiography 59-60 
(2011) 128-149. 
14
 International Human Rights Law Institute, The Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict Justice (2007), 
principle 2.5. 
15
 On the ECtHR and IACtHR case law, see Introductory Note in The Global Community Yearbook of 
International Law and Jurisprudence 2001-2015. 
16
 On the ECtHR and IACtHR case law in a comparative approach see L.Cassetti, A. Di Stasi, C. Landa 
Arroyo (cur.), Diritti e giurisprudenza. La Corte Interamericana dei diritti umani e la Corte europea di 
Strasburgo/Derechos y Jurisprudencia. Corte Interamericana y Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, 
Napoli 2014. 
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armed conflicts, considering “the desire” to know the fate of loved ones as “a basic 
human need which should be satisfied to the greatest extent possible”
17
. 
However, the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
18
  
replicating the principle of public conscience
19
, expressly identifies “the right” of 
families to know the fate of their relatives who disappeared as a result of armed conflicts 
(Article 32) and the corresponding obligation of the parties to the conflict to search for 
persons reported as missing (Article 33)
20
. 
The forced disappearances perpetrated under the dictatorial regimes of Augusto Pinochet 
in Chile and the junta military in Argentina induced the United Nations to dedicate 
studies and documents to the matter and appoint special commissions of inquiry known 
as Truth Commissions
21
. In parallel, Inter-American jurisprudence developed the most 
striking pronunciations in this domain
22
. 
International scholars and institutions that have addressed the right to the truth have 
prevalently examined this as an instrument to fight the impunity of criminals,
23
 as an 
expression of the right of victims (and their families) to have access to information on 
the violations suffered and to actively participate in the proceedings related to the crimes 
committed
24




Nevertheless, the right to the truth does not only concern the right of access to 
information (both individual and collective)
26
, but also the positive obligation of States 
to adopt all necessary measures to protect such human right
27
, particularly through 
                                                 
17
 GA Res. 3220 (XXIX) Assistance and Cooperation in Accounting for Persons Who Are Missing or 
Dead in Armed Conflicts (Nov. 6, 1974). 
18
 See Art. 16 and 26 of the IV Geneva Convention and Art. 12 et seq. of the II Geneva Convention; see 
also Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Study on the Right to the Truth, 
E/CN.4/2006/91 (Feb. 8, 2006), para. 6. 
19
 See T. Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity and Dictates of Public Conscience, in 
American Journal of International Law 94.1 (2000) 78. 
20
 See É. David, Principes de droit des conflits armés, Bruxelles 1994, 502. See also Res. II of the XXIV 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (Manila 1981); Rule 117 in J. M. Henckaerts, 
L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume I: Rules, Cambridge 2005, 421. 
21
 J. M. Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth: Truth Commissions, Impunity and the 
Inter-American Human Rights System, in Boston University International Law Journal 12 (1994) 321. 
22
 K. Dykmann, Impunity and the Right to Truth in the Inter-American System of Human Rights, in 
Iberoamericana 7.26 (2007) 45ss. See also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IAComHR), 
The Right to Truth in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.152 Doc. 2 (Aug. 13, 2014), available online at 
<http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Right-to-Truth-en.pdf>. 
23
 D. Cassel, La lucha contra la impunidad ante el sistema interamericano de derechos humanos, in J. E. 
Méndez, M. Abregú, J. Mariezcurrena (eds.), Verdad y Justicia. Homenaje a Emilio F. Mignone, San José 
(2001), 357ss.;  M. Crettol, A.-M. La Rosa, The Missing and Transitional Justice: The Right to Know and 
the Fight Against Impunity, in International Review of the Red Cross 88.869 (2006) 355ss. 
24
 D. Groome, The Right to Truth in the Fight against Impunity, in Berkeley Journal of International Law 
29 (2011) 189ss. 
25
 T. M. Antkowiak, Truth as Right and Remedy in International Human Rights Experience, in Michigan 
Journal of International Law 23 (2002) 977ss. 
26
 J. E. Méndez, The Right to Truth, in C. C. Joyner (ed.), M. C. Bassiouni (spec. ed.), Reining in Impunity 
for International Crimes and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: Proceedings of the 
Siracusa Conference, 17-21 September 1998, Toulouse 1998, available online at <www.mpepil.com>. 
27
 IAComHR, Report No. 136/99, para. 221 (Dec. 22, 1999). 
 





. In Juan Mendez’s definition, the right to the truth 
is described as “a State obligation to reveal to the victims and society everything known 
about the facts and circumstances of massive and systematic human rights violation of 
the past including the identity of the perpetrators and instigators”
29
. 
The “composite” content of this right also emerges in the multitude of terms used, such 
as right to know, right to the truth, right to know the truth, right to the historical truth, 
right to truth and information, to name but a few. 
At the universal level, the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances (WGEID) in 1981 recognized the “indisputable” existence of the “right 
to know” of the next of kin of victims of enforced disappearances
30
. More recently, in 
the General Comment on the Right to the Truth in Relation to Enforced Disappearances 
submitted in 2010, the Working Group established that the State’s refusal to provide 
information concerning the fate of victims of enforced disappearances constitutes a 
limitation to the right to the truth
31
. 
A first evolution of the right to the truth can be ascribed to Louis Joinet’s final report on 
the Question of Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations of 1997 that 
included the “right to know” of victims of serious violations of human rights
32
 among 
the principles for the fight against the impunity of criminals while disjoining it from 
armed conflicts and from international humanitarian law, and examining its “collective” 
dimension.  
Recalling the preliminary report submitted to the Sub-Commission in 1993, the Special 
Rapporteur  remarked “the history of impunity is one of perpetual conflict [...] between 
the human conscience and barbarism”, ascribing four principles to the “right to know”: 
the inalienable right to the truth recognized to every people, the duty to remember 
corresponding to State obligation, the victims’ right to know the circumstances of the 
violation and the fate of persons who have died or disappeared, and finally, the 
guarantees to give effect to the right to know through judicial commissions of inquiry, 
truth commissions and access to archives. 
Updated in 2005 by Diane Orentlicher, the Set of Principles for the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity includes the “right to 
                                                 
28
 ECtHR, Case of Kurt v. Turkey, Applications Nos. 15/1997/799/1002, Judgment (May 25, 1998), para. 
140. 
29
 Méndez, The Right cit. 255ss. 
30
 “[…] There can be no doubt that the families of the disappeared are anxiously hoping that the Group 
will be able to obtain information for them on that which they have been unable themselves to discover; 
the fate or present whereabouts of the disappeared. Unquestionably, their right to know can be neither 
denied nor ignored”, UN Commission on Human Rights, Question of the Human Rights of All Persons 
Subjected to any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Question of Missing and Disappeared 
Persons, Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, E/CN.4/1492 (Dec. 
31, 1981), para. 5. 
31
 See Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, General Comment on the Right to the 
Truth in Relation to Enforced Disappearances, A/HRC/16/48, para. 3 (2010): “[…] [T]he relatives of the 
victims should be closely associated with an investigation into a case of enforced disappearance. The 
refusal to provide information is a limitation on the right to the truth. Such a limitation must be strictly 
proportionate to the only legitimate aim: to avoid jeopardizing an ongoing criminal investigation. A 
refusal to provide any information, or to communicate with the relatives at all, in other words a blanket 
refusal, is a violation of the right to the truth […]”. 
32
 UN Commission on Human Rights, Question of Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations 
(Civil and Political Rights), Final Report prepared by Mr L. Joinet, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/18 (June 20, 
1996), paras. 17-25. 
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know” within the “effective measures” to fight the impunity of criminals also in contexts 
other than enforced disappearances such as summary executions and acts of torture
33
. 
The first principle establishes that “[i]mpunity arises from a failure by States to meet 
their obligations to investigate violations [and] to ensure the inalienable right to know 
the truth about violations”. Similarly, Resolution 9/11 adopted in 2008 by the United 
Nations Human Rights Council recognizes “the importance of respecting and ensuring 




The search for truth through investigations and the punishment of those responsible is 
also mentioned in the commentary of Article 37 of the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001, which lists 
conducting adequate investigations and the criminal prosecution of individuals whose 




However, in 2006, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights completed a detailed 
study on the matter, describing the “right to the truth” as an “inalienable and 
autonomous” mandatory right and not subject to limitations (albeit closely linked with 
other rights), characterized by both an individual and social dimension and directly 
connected to the obligation of States to protect human rights, to conduct adequate 
investigations and to guarantee effective remedies and restitutions
36
. 
On a regional level, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe reaffirmed the 
right of families to know the fate of their loved ones in the recommendations concerning 
political prisoners who disappeared in Chile (adopted in 1979)
37
 and national refugees, 
and those who disappeared in Cyprus (adopted in 1987)
38
. 
In 1983, the European Parliament also dedicated a resolution to the missing persons in 
Cyprus, confirming the inalienable right of all the families to know the fate of their 
loved ones who disappeared as a result of the governments’ or their agents’ actions
39
. 
The link between right to the truth, access to justice and fighting against the impunity of 
criminals also emerged in the Guidelines on Eradicating Impunity for Serious Human 





, as well as in the General Report 2003-2004 of the European Committee for the 
                                                 
33
 UN Commission on Human Rights, Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of 
Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity, Report prepared by D. Orentlicher, 
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005). 
34
 Human Rights Council, Res. 9/11, Right to the Truth, A/HRC/9/L.12, para. 1 (2008). See also Human 
Rights Council, Res. 12/12, Right to the Truth, A/HRC/RES/12/12 (2009), para. 1. 
35
 “[…] The appropriate form of satisfaction will depend on the circumstances and cannot be prescribed in 
advance. Many possibilities exist, including due inquiry into the causes of an accident resulting in harm or 
injury, a trust fund to manage compensation payments in the interests of the beneficiaries, disciplinary or 
penal action against the individuals whose conduct caused the internationally wrongful act […]”, 
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, with commentaries, Article 37 (Commentary) (2001), at 106. 
36
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Study on the Right to the Truth, 
cit.. 
37
 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Rec. 868 (June 5, 1979), paras. 7-12. 
38
 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Rec. 1056 (ii) (May 5, 1987), para. 17. 
39
 European Parliament, Resolution on Missing Persons in Cyprus (Jan. 11, 1983), para. (E), (H)(2). 
40
 Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Eradicating Impunity for Serious Human Rights 
Violations, Guideline VII (March 30, 2011). 
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Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)
41
 and 
in the European Council Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal 
proceedings adopted in 2001
42
. 
The right to the truth and to memory (el derecho a la verdad y a la memoria) was also 
debated by Mercosur member States in the 2005 summit within the context of affirming 




With regard to binding international instruments, the right to the truth is not expressly 
covered by the European Convention on Human Rights nor the Pact of San José. It was 
first recognized in the 2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance (entered into force in 2010) that clarified the content of 
the right “to know the truth”
44
. The notion of “victim” in the 2006 Convention refers to 
both a disappeared person and any individual who has suffered harm as the direct result 
of an enforced disappearance. Under Article 24, the right to the truth concerns the right 
to know: i) the circumstances of the enforced disappearance, ii) the progress and results 
of the investigations, and iii) the fate of the disappeared person. Moreover, it entails the 
corresponding obligation of State parties to adopt “appropriate measures in this regard”. 
The cited WGEID General Comment expands the content of the right to the truth and 
includes the right to know the identity of those responsible and, in the case of the 
disappeared person being found dead, the right of the family to receive the remains, 
clearly and indisputably identified including through DNA testing, and to dispose of 




3.- Gross Violations of Human Rights and the “Right to the Truth” in the 
European Court of Human Rights Case-Law 
 
A. The Right to the Truth in the ECtHR Jurisprudence before the El-Masri Case 
Prior to the El-Masri case, the ECtHR did not directly address the issue of the right to 
the truth, preferring to implicitly surmise it from the right to life, the prohibition of 
torture and the right to effective remedy expressly enshrined in the ECHR. This 
approach characterized the 1998 Kurt v. Turkey case
46
 (concerning the alleged 
disappearance of a detainee), the 2001 Cyprus v. Turkey
47
 and, more recently, the 2009 
Varnava and Others v. Turkey
48
 cases (both concerning the violations of human rights of 
missing Greek Cypriots and their relatives since the 1974 Turkish invasion of 
                                                 
41
 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 14
th
 General Report on the CPT’s Activities, covering the period of 1 August 2003 to 31 July 
2004, para. 36 (Sept. 21, 2004). 
42
 European Council, Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 on the Standing of Victims in Criminal 
Proceedings, 2001/220/JHA, Article 4 (2001), para. 2. 
43
 MERCOSUR, Comunicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de los Estados Partes del Mercosur y de los 
Estados Asociados (June 20, 2005). 
44
 T. Scovazzi, G. Citroni, The Struggle against Enforced Disappearance and the 2007 United Nations 
Convention, Leiden/Boston 2007. 
45
 Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, General Comment on the Right to the 
Truth in Relation to Enforced Disappearances cit., para. 6. 
46
 ECtHR, Case of Kurt, cit. 
47
 ECtHR, Case of Cyprus v. Turkey, Application No. 25781/94, Judgment (May 10, 2001). 
48
 ECtHR, Case of Varnava and Others v. Turkey, Applications Nos. 16064/90; 16065/90; 16066/90; 
16068/90; 16069/90; 16070/90; 16071/90; 16072/90; 16073/90, Judgment (Sept. 18, 2009). 
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Cyprus) where the Court ascribed the absence of effective investigations of the fate of 
the disappeared persons to a violation of the procedural obligation to protect the right to 
life enshrined in Article 2 of the ECHR that imposes “a continuing obligation” to give 
account of the fate of the victims of enforced disappearances. 
The pronouncement in the Cyprus v. Turkey case also linked the absence of effective 
investigations to forms of inhuman treatment suffered by the victims’ families. In the 
Court’s view: “The silence of the authorities of the respondent State in the face of the 
real concerns of the relatives of the missing persons attains a level of severity which can 
only be categorised as inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3”
49
. 
According to the ECtHR, in cases of serious violations of human rights (i.e., torture), the 
notion of “effective remedy” under Article 13 of the ECHR imposes, in addition to 
compensation, the implicit obligation to proceed to a “prompt and impartial 
investigation”
50
 capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those 
responsible and the applicant’s access to such investigation proceedings
51
. 
Indeed, still under debate is whether the names of the perpetrators of violations of 
human rights should be disclosed in exercising the right to know the truth
52
 and thus 
whether the right to learn the progress and results of the investigation can be considered 
absolute. When ascertaining the facts is left to non- or quasi-judicial organs (i.e., Truth 
Commission), this aspect of the right to the truth runs the risk of conflicting with the 
right to a fair trial (and particularly with the presumption of innocence) scarcely 
guaranteed in such contexts. If, instead, the right to the truth is established within the 
criminal procedure framework or after determining criminal responsibility by a court, no 
conflict with the principles of fair trial arises
53
. 
At times, political considerations can limit the right to know the truth of the 
circumstances of the violations. Indeed, State practice indicates that in some cases, the 
choice to conceal parts of the truth has been determined by the need to accelerate the 
reconciliation process. However, the ECtHR has excluded that a “politically sensitive” 
approach would condition the respect of human rights, clarifying “[t]hat can have no 
                                                 
49
 ECtHR, Case of Cyprus v. Turkey cit., para. 157. The Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina also applied Article 3 of the ECHR to the suffering caused by the government's failure to 
provide information to the families of the missing people (Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Srebrenica Cases, Case No. CH/01/8365 et al., Decision on Admissibility and Merits (Mar. 
7, 2003)). In a similar approach, see the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights: “[H]olding 
an individual without permitting him or her to have any contact with his or her family, and refusing to 
inform the family if and where the individual is being held, is inhuman treatment of both the detainee and 
the family concerned”, African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Amnesty International v. 
Sudan, Communications No. 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93 (1999), para. 54. See also the rulings of the UN 
Human Rights Committee in the cases of Sarma v. Sri Lanka (July 16, 2003), para. 9.5 and Lyashkevich 
v. Belarus (Apr. 3, 2003), para. 9.2. 
50
 ECtHR, Case of Aksoy v. Turkey, Application Nos. 100/1995/606/694, Judgment (Dec. 18, 1996), para. 
98. 
51
 ECtHR, Case of El-Masri cit., para. 98. See also the African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights, Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, DOC/OS 
(XXX) 247, Principle C (b)(3), (d): “The right to an effective remedy includes: […] access to the factual 
information concerning the violations. […] The granting of amnesty to absolve perpetrators of human 
rights violations from accountability violates the right of victims to an effective remedy”. 
52
 P. B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths. Confronting State Terror and Atrocity, New York 2001, 139ss. 
53
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Study on the Right to the Truth cit.,  
para. 39. 
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bearing on the application of the provisions of the Convention”
54
. Rather, it stated that in 
cases of persons found wounded, dead or who have disappeared in areas under the 
control of the respondent State, the burden of proof may shift to the national authorities 
that are obliged to disclose the documents needed to allow the Court to ascertain the 
facts or otherwise provide satisfactory and convincing explanations
55
, without being able 
to oppose interests of national security to access information. Interpreting the concept of 
national security from a democratic perspective, the ECtHR excluded that this could 
legitimize the secrecy of criminal State activities such as the torture or the enforced 
disappearance of persons. The Court analysed this latter issue in the context of 
“lustration” proceedings launched in Eastern Europe as a central element of transition 
after the fall of communist regimes. In particular, it excluded that secrecy of serious 
violations of human rights committed by State agencies during an authoritarian regime is 
an indispensable condition for the national security of the “new” democratic order based 
on the rule of law
56
. 
In two more recent cases of “historical sensitivity”, the ECtHR highlighted the 
individual and collective “intent” of the right to the truth.  
In the Association “21 December 1989” v. Romania case, the Court dealt with the 
absence of investigations of the murders perpetrated by State agents during the 1989 
Romanian revolution, condemned by world politics as “revolting and offensive at the 
address of the international public consciousness”
57
. In this case, the ECtHR recognized 
the right of victims and their families to ascertain the truth on the circumstances of 
events causing the widespread violation of human rights
58
. Such right applies not only in 
cases of massive and systematic abuses but also in singular cases of sufficient gravity
59
. 
The Court also stressed “[the] importance for Romanian Society” to resolve these cases 
                                                 
54
 ECtHR, Case of Varnava and Others cit., para. 193. 
55
 Id., para. 184. 
56
 ECtHR, Case of Turek v. Slovakia, Application No. 57986/00, Judgment (Feb. 14, 2006), para. 115: 
“[I]n proceedings related to the operations of state security agencies, there may be legitimate grounds to 
limit access to certain documents and other materials. However, in respect of lustration proceedings, this 
consideration loses much of its validity. In the first place, lustration proceedings are, by their very nature, 
oriented towards the establishment of facts dating back to the communist era and are not directly linked to 
the current functions and operations of the security services. Thus, unless the contrary is shown on the 
facts of a specific case, it cannot be assumed that there remains a continuing and actual public interest in 
imposing limitations on access to materials classified as confidential under former regimes. Secondly, 
lustration proceedings inevitably depend on the examination of documents relating to the operations of the 
former communist security agencies. If the party to whom the classified materials relate is denied access 
to all or most of the materials in question, his or her possibilities to contradict the security agency’s 
version of the facts would be severely curtailed. Finally, under the relevant laws, it is typically the security 
agency itself that has the power to decide what materials should remain classified and for how long. Since, 
it is the legality of the agency’s actions which is in question in lustration proceedings, the existence of this 
power is not consistent with the fairness of the proceedings, including the principle of equality of arms. 
Thus, if a State is to adopt lustration measures, it must ensure that the persons affected hereby enjoy all 
procedural guarantees under the Convention in respect of any proceedings relating to the application of 
such measures”. 
57
 See e.g., the Statement of the Senator of Colorado William Armstrong, as mentioned in Duţu (2012: 
142).  
58
 ECtHR, Case of Association “21 December 1989” v. Romania, Application No. 33810/07, Judgment 
(May 24, 2011), para. 106. 
59
 Amicus Curiae Submission to the IACtHR from The Open Society Justice Initiative, La Asociación 
Pro-Derechos Humanos and La Comisión Mexicana De Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos, 
A.C., in the Case of Gudiel Álvarez y Otros (“Diario Militar”) v. Guatemala (May 10, 2012), para. 14. 
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and discover past abuses, ascribing the “right of numerous victims to know what 
happened” to the right to an effective investigation and the right to a remedy
60
. 
Similarly, in the Janowiec v. Russia case, the Strasbourg Court addressed the matter of 
the truth in a series of mass executions of Polish prisoners of war committed in Katyn 
Forest in the 40s and affecting “the conscience of the entire civilized world”
61
. Ruling 
on the “Katyn massacre”, the ECtHR examined the absence of adequate investigations 
and the Russian government’s refusal to provide information on the murders perpetrated 
by the secret police within the framework of inhuman and degrading treatment 
prohibited under Article 3 of the ECHR. In the judgment of April 2012, the Court 
recognized a “double trauma” to the applicants: the loss of their loved ones and the 
historical distortion imposed by the Soviet and Polish communist authorities over 50 
years and thus also after the respondent State’s ratification to the Convention
62
. At the 
same time, the ECtHR also reaffirmed the unconditional right of judicial organs to 
examine the information needed to ascertain the truth on alleged violations of human 
rights and considered the Russian government’s refusal to provide the required 
documents - specifically, the 2004 decision to archive the case - contrary to the 
obligation to cooperate enshrined in ECHR Article 38. As the ECtHR has absolute 
discretion in determining which documents are required to examine the case submitted 
to it, the Court did not accept the Russian authorities’ evaluation of the irrelevance of the 
documents as evidence
63




ECtHR jurisprudence has also examined the “right to seek historical truth” within the 
“cultural rights” framework as a component of the right to freedom of expression 
enshrined in ECHR Article 10
65
. The Court specifically stated that every country must 
ensure the open and objective debate of its own history
66
, excluding that the denial and 
the revisionism of mass crimes that outraged the conscience of mankind and established 
historical facts (i.e., the Holocaust) fall within the guarantees of ECHR Article 10
67
 and, 
                                                 
60





 ECtHR, Case of Janowiec and Others v. Russia, Applications Nos. 55508/07, 29520/09, Judgment (Apr. 
16, 2012), para. 156. 
63
 Id., para. 100: “It is a fundamental requirement that the requested material must be submitted in its 
entirety, if the Court so requested, and any missing elements must be properly accounted for”. 
64
 Id., para. 109: “The Court is not convinced that a public and transparent investigation into the crimes of 
the previous totalitarian regime could have compromised the national security interests of the 
contemporary democratic Russian Federation, especially taking into account that the responsibility of the 
Soviet authorities for that crime has been acknowledged at the highest political level […]”. See T. 
Scovazzi, Considerazioni in tema di segreto di Stato e gravi violazioni dei diritti umani, in G. Venturini, 
S. Bariatti (ed.), Diritti individuali e giustizia internazionale - Liber Fausto Pocar, Milano 2009, 885ss., 
893. 
65
 Research Division, Report, Cultural Rights in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(Jan. 2011), paras. 41-43, available online at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_cultural_rights_ENG.pdf>. 
66
 ECtHR, Case of Monnat v. Switzerland, Application No. 73604/01, Judgment (Dec. 21, 2006), para. 64. 
67
 ECtHR, Case of Lehideux and Isorni v. France, Application No. 24662/94, Judgment (Sept. 23, 1998), 
para. 51; see also ECtHR, Case of Garaudy v. France, Application No. 65831/01, Decision (June 24, 
2003), at 23: “There can be no doubt that denying the reality of clearly established historical facts, such as 
the Holocaust, as the applicant does in his book, does not constitute historical research akin to a quest for 
the truth. The aim and the result of that approach are completely different, the real purpose being to 
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finally, stressing that access to original documentary sources for legitimate historical 




B. The ECtHR’s Crucial Breakthrough in the Recognition of the Right to the Truth since 
the El-Masri Case 
As mentioned, the El-Masri judgment delivered by the ECtHR in 2012 has been hailed 
as a landmark ruling in cases involving both secret prisons and operations on European 
soil and the search for the truth. The El-Masri rendition also kindled a heated debate on 
the United States’ violations of the international prohibition against subjecting a person 
to treatments “that shock the conscience of any nation governed by the rule of law”
69
. 
As regards the facts of the case, on his way to Skopje (Macedonia) in December 2003, 
Khaled El-Masri was stopped at the Serbian-Macedonian border due to some doubts on 
the validity of the German passport he was recently issued. Suspected by Macedonian 
police of involvement in terrorist activities, El-Masri was held in isolation in a hotel 
where he was interrogated, beaten, tortured and deprived of the possibility of accessing a 
judge, contacting a lawyer or communicating with his family. After about a month, he 
was handed over to CIA agents and transferred (extra-judicially) to Afghanistan into a 
facility north of Kabul known as the “Salt Pit” where he continued to be the victim of 
inhuman and degrading treatment for four months. The interrogations, in addition to 
being poorly understood by Khaled El-Masri, were constantly accompanied by threats, 
insults and abuse. His repeated requests to meet with a representative of the German 
government were ignored. On returning to Germany in 2004, El-Masri launched a civil 
case in the US in 2006, which the local courts - invoking the State secrets privilege - did 
not pursue. No less favourable were the implications of the criminal and civil complaints 
presented in Macedonia in 2006 and 2009 that were considered unfounded. In 2008, El-
Masri submitted the case to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, but the 
United States, not party to the 1969 American Convention, refused to cooperate and 
blocked the procedural path
70
. 
Turning to the European Court of Human Rights in 2009, El-Masri was finally able to 
obtain justice from the Strasbourg judges. Although the application referred to events 
that had occurred 5 years previously, the Court, also due to the “sensitivity of the 
matter”
71




                                                                                                                                                
rehabilitate the National-Socialist regime and, as a consequence, accuse the victims themselves of 
falsifying history. Denying crimes against humanity is therefore one of the most serious forms of racial 
defamation of Jews and of incitement to hatred of them. The denial or rewriting of this type of historical 
fact undermines the values on which the fight against racism and anti-Semitism are based and constitutes a 
serious threat to public order. Such acts are incompatible with democracy and human rights because they 
infringe the rights of others. Their proponents indisputably have designs that fall into the category of aims 
prohibited by Article 17 of the Convention”. 
68




 IAComHR, El-Masri v. United States, Petition No. 419-08 (Apr. 9, 2008). 
71
 ECtHR, Case of El-Masri cit., para. 142. 
72
 Id., paras. 135-136: “The object of the six-month time-limit under Article 35 § 1 is to promote legal 
certainty, by ensuring that cases raising issues under the Convention are dealt with in a reasonable time 
and that past decisions are not continually open to challenge. […] Where an applicant avails himself of an 
apparently existing remedy and only subsequently becomes aware of circumstances which render the 
remedy ineffective, it may be appropriate for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 to take the start of the six-
 
 
 Iura & Legal Systems – ISSN 2385-2445   2016, C(8): 66-95 
78 
 
As to the alleged violations, the Grand Chamber considered the applicant’s allegations 
of abuses as proven beyond any reasonable doubt
73
, deeming the State of Macedonian 
responsible for violating ECHR Articles 3 and 5 (on both a substantial and procedural 
level), Articles 8 and 13, and sentencing it to pay 60,000 euro for the non-pecuniary 
damages suffered by El-Masri
74
.  
Regarding the “substantial” violation of Article 3 of the Convention, the Court 
concluded that the manner in which the applicant was placed in the custody of US 
authorities constituted a case of extraordinary rendition, namely, the extrajudicial 
transfer of a person from the jurisdiction of a State to that of another for purposes of 
detention and interrogation outside the normal legal system where there is a real risk of 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
75
. 
According to the Grand Chamber, at the material time, the Macedonian authorities: 1) 
knew or should have known that there was a real risk that the applicant would be 
subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment
76
, 2) did not ask the United States 
authorities for any guarantees to ensure that the applicant was not ill-treated
77
, and 3) in 
transferring El-Masri to the custody of US authorities, knowingly exposed him to the 
real risk of ill-treatment and to detention in violation of “one of the most fundamental 
values of democratic societies”
78
. 
On the procedural level, the Court reiterated that Article 3 of the ECHR, in conjunction 
with the general obligation of States to protect human rights in accordance with Article 1 
of the 1950 European Convention, implicitly postulates conducting effective 
investigations leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. 
Knowledge of truth has a specific preventive role in constructing and strengthening a 
democratic State: the response of national authorities to the serious violations of human 
rights through conducting proper investigations is essential “in maintaining public 
confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of 
collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts”
79
. The summary investigation conducted by 
the Macedonian authorities prevented ascertaining the truth, and according to the 
ECtHR, also violated Article 3 of the Convention on a procedural level
80
. In particular, 
the lack of adequate investigations on the incident had a significant effect on the right to 
                                                                                                                                                
month period from the date when the applicant first became or ought to have become aware of those 
circumstances”. 
73
 Id., paras. 167, 199. 
74
 The Court instead excluded violation of Article 10 (right to freedom of expression) invoked separately, 
ascribing the matter of the right to be informed of the circumstances of the applicant’s proclaimed 
violation to those previously examined under Article 3 of the ECHR (see ECtHR, Case of El-Masri cit., 
paras. 264-265). 
75
Id., para. 221; ECtHR, Case of Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 
24027/07,11949/08 and 36742/08, Decision (July 6, 2010), para. 113. On the practice of extraordinary 
renditions, see D. Weissbrodt, A. Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights Analysis, Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 19 (2006), 123ss. 
76
 ECtHR, Case of El-Masri cit., para. 218. 
77
 Id., para. 219. 
78
 Id., para. 195. 
79
 Id., para. 192.  
80
 Id.: “The inadequate investigation in the present case deprived the applicant of being informed of what 
had happened, including of getting an accurate account of the suffering he had allegedly endured and the 
role of those responsible for his alleged ordeal”.  
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the truth, preventing the applicant, other victims of similar conduct and the entire 
collectivity from being informed on what had happened. 
“[T]he Court also wishes to address another aspect of the inadequate character of the 
investigation in the present case, namely its impact on the right to the truth regarding the 
relevant circumstances of the case. In this connection it underlines the great importance 
of the present case not only for the applicant and his family, but also for other victims of 
similar crimes and the general public, who had the right to know what had happened 
[…]. The inadequate investigation in the present case deprived the applicant of being 
informed of what had happened, including of getting an accurate account of the 




Applying the same line of reasoning to examining the violation of the right to freedom 
and security, the Court found that the respondent State did not conduct a proper 
investigation into the applicant’s allegations of arbitrary detention
82
, thus infringing 
Article 5 of the Convention on a procedural level
83
. 
In substantive terms, the Court, having highlighted the importance of Article 5 of the 
ECHR “for securing the right of individuals in a democracy”
84
, considered that the 
seizure and detention of the applicant constituted a case of “enforced disappearance” as 
defined by international law
85
, characterized by uncertainty and lack of information on 
the fate of the person concerned, and that the Macedonian authorities should be held 
responsible for the violation of the rights recognized to the applicant under Article 5 of 
the ECHR
86
 during “the entire period of his captivity” and also for the abuse suffered 
outside the Macedonian territory
87
. 
In the Court’s opinion, the acts and omissions imputed to the respondent State also 
resulted in unlawful interference in the applicant’s private and family life, thus also 
holding the State liable under Article 8 of the Convention
88
.  
With regard to the violation of the right to an effective remedy, the scope of the 
obligation under ECHR Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the violations 
claimed by the applicant. In the case of inhuman and degrading treatment, for example, 
the notion of “effective remedy” entails, in addition to payment of compensation where 
appropriate, conducting a thorough and effective investigation that can lead to the 
identification and punishment of those responsible and the applicant’s access to the 
                                                 
81
 Id., paras. 191-192. 
82
 Id., para. 242. 
83
 Id., para. 243. 
84
 Id., para. 230. 
85
 Id., paras. 95, 100. 
86
 Id., para. 233. 
87
 Id., para. 240: “The applicant’s “enforced disappearance”, although temporary, was characterised by an 
ongoing situation of uncertainty and unaccountability, which extended through the entire period of his 
captivity […]. In this connection the Court would point out that in the case of a series of wrongful acts or 
omissions, the breach extends over the entire period starting with the first of the acts and continuing for as 
long as the acts or omissions are repeated and remain at variance with the international obligation 
concerned […]”.  
88
 Id., para. 249: “Having regard to its conclusions concerning the respondent State’s responsibility under 
Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, the Court considers that the State’s actions and omissions likewise 
engaged its responsibility under Article 8 of the Convention. In view of the established evidence, the 
Court considers that the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life was 
not “in accordance with the law””. 
 





. However, the elements aimed at determining the effectiveness 
of the remedies under ECHR Article 13 are broader than the obligation to conduct an 
effective investigation under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention
90
. Given the irreversible 
nature of the harm that could occur if the risk of ill-treatment reported were confirmed, 
the notion of effective remedy under Article 13 requires the impartial verification of the 
facts alleged by the applicant without regard to the cause of State policy (i.e., the 
behaviour of the person concerned or any threats to national security)
91
. The 
Macedonian judicial authority’s superficial approach to the applicant’s allegations of ill-
treatment and illegal deprivation of freedom thus deprived him of the opportunity to 
pursue remedies that could lead to the identification and punishment of those responsible 
and compensation as set forth in ECHR Article 13
92
. 
In the 2014 Al Nashiri and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) cases, the ECtHR confirmed the 
findings of the El-Masri judgment, deeming, inter alia, that on account of its 
“acquiescence and connivance” in the “High-Value Detainees” (HVD) Programme, 
Poland must be considered responsible for violating Article 3 of the Convention in its 
substantive aspect
93
. In the Court’s view:  
 “the treatment to which the applicant was subjected by the CIA during his detention in 




Referring to the El-Masri case, the ECtHR also stated that failing to conduct an effective 
investigation into the circumstances surrounding the applicants’ ill-treatment, detention 
and transfer from the Polish territory, Poland violated ECtHR Article 3 in its procedural 
aspect. As the ECtHR explained in the Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) case: 
“where allegations of serious human rights violations are involved in the investigation, 
the right to the truth regarding the relevant circumstances of the case does not belong 
solely to the victim of the crime and his or her family but also to other victims of similar 
violations and the general public, who have the right to know what has happened. An 
adequate response by the authorities in investigating allegations of serious human rights 
violations may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in 
their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of impunity, 




4.- The Reconstruction and Evolution of the Right to the Truth in Inter-American 
Court Jurisprudence 
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 Id., para. 255. 
90
 Id., para. 256. 
91
 Id., para. 257. 
92
 Id., paras. 258, 262: “The Court has established that the applicant brought the substance of his 
grievances under Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention to the attention of the public prosecutor. Those 
complaints were never the subject of any serious investigation, being discounted in favour of a hastily 
reached explanation that he had never been subjected to any of the actions complained of. […] 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the applicant was denied the right to an effective remedy under Article 
13, taken in conjunction with Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention”. 
93
 ECtHR, Case of Al Nashiri cit., para. 516; ECtHR, Case of Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) cit., para. 512. 
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 ECtHR, Case of Al Nashiri cit., para. 517; ECtHR, Case of Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) cit., para. 511. 
95
 Id., para. 488. 
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A. The Right to the Truth and the Obligation to Protect Human Rights in Inter-American 
Case-Law Before the Gomes Lund Ruling 
Although the right to the truth is not expressly enshrined in the ECHR or in the Pact of 
San José, part of the doctrine considers that this can be implicitly deduced from the 
conventional obligation to protect human rights
96
. 
Such orientation is supported by the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, ascribing to the general obligation to respect human 
rights foreseen in Article 1 (1) of the 1969 Convention the duty of State parties to meet 
the legitimate expectations of the next of kin of victims to know their fate and counteract 
the impunity of those responsible for the violations
97
. 
However, while the Inter-American Commission, since the first pronunciations, 
examined the right to the truth as an autonomous right under the 1969 Convention
98
, the 
Inter-American Court did not immediately embrace this orientation. In its jurisprudence, 
“the right to the truth” is often linked to the rights to a fair trial or access to justice, at 
times “subsumed” in the guarantees established in Articles 8 and 25 of Pact of San 
José
99
, and at others, as conditio sine qua non to make effective the right to a fair trial 
and judicial remedies. In the dissenting opinion expressed in the Bámaca Velásquez 
case, Judge Cançado Trindade, for example, remarked on the “prevalence” of the right 




At the same time, according to the Court of San José, the need to guarantee a fair trial 
prevails over national security interests. The State secrets privilege can therefore not be 
invoked to hinder access to information deemed necessary to ascertain the truth and the 
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 Pasqualucci, The Whole cit. 330. 
97
 In IACtHR’s words: “The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights 
violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed 
within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure 
the victim adequate compensation” (IACtHR, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez cit., para. 174). The 
Commission stated that, “[t]he interpretation of the generic obligations established in Article 1.1 made by 
the Court […] allows for the conclusion that the “right to truth” is a basic and indispensable consequence 
for every State Party”, IAComHR, Alfonso René Chanfeau Oraycem (Chile), Report Nº 25/98, (April 7, 
1998), para. 87. 
98
 IAComHR, Annual Reports 1985-86, at 205; Manuel Bolanos v. Ecuador, Report (Sept. 12 1995); and 
Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Report (Mar. 7, 1996). 
99
 IACtHR, Case of Bámaca-Velásquez, cit., para. 201. See also L. Burgorgue-Larsen, A. Ubeda de 
Torres, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Case Law and Commentary, New York (2011).  
100
 IACtHR, Case of Bámaca-Velásquez, cit., Separate Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, paras. 
29, 32: “The search for truth constitutes the starting-point for the liberation as well as the protection of the 
human being; without truth (however unbearable it might come to be) one cannot be freed from the 
torment of uncertainty, and it is not possible either to exercise the protected rights. […] The right to truth 
indeed requires the investigation by the State of the wrongful facts, and its prevalence constitutes, 
moreover, as already observed, the prerequisite for the effective access itself to justice - at national and 
international levels - on the part of the relatives of the disappeared person (judicial guarantees and 
protection under Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention). As the State is under the duty to cease 
the violations of human rights, the prevalence of the right to truth is essential to the struggle against 
impunity, and is ineluctably linked to the very realization of justice, and to the guarantee of non-repetition 
of those violations”. 
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good administration of justice: “Th[e] refusal […] to supply all the documents requested 
by the courts, resorting to official secret, constitutes an obstruction of justice”
101
. 
The right to know “the full, complete and public truth” on past events, their 
circumstances and those responsible also often emerges in the Inter-American 
jurisprudence as “part of the right” of the next of kin of victims and society as a whole 
“to reparation for human rights violations, with respect to satisfaction and guarantees of 
non-repetition”
102
. The analysis of international practice confirms that in cases of serious 
violations of fundamental rights, pecuniary compensation is not enough to repair the 
injuries suffered
103
. In such contexts, the right to reparation of victims and their next of 
kin can only be fulfilled by putting an end to the situation of uncertainty and lack of 




Including the right to the truth in the notion of reparation does not however circumscribe 
its entitlement to the victims and their next of kin, nor does it circumvent its collective 
dimension and the interests of civil society as a whole, as holders of legitimate 
expectations to access information on serious violations of human rights
105
. In this 
perspective, “access to truth” is closely linked to the right to receive and provide 
information under Article 13 of the Pact of San José. This approach is also confirmed by 
the Inter-American Commission in defining the right to know the truth as “a collective 




The right of society to know its past, beyond representing a form of reparation and an 
instrument to shed light on the facts that have occurred, also serves the purpose of 
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 IACtHR, Case of Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala, Judgment (Nov. 25, 2003), para. 182. See also 
para. 180: “[I]n cases of human rights violations, the State authorities cannot resort to mechanisms such as 
official secrets or confidentiality of the information, or reasons of public interest or national security, to 
refuse to supply the information required by the judicial or administrative authorities in charge of the 
ongoing investigation or proceeding”. See also id., para. 181: “there is a possible conflict of interests 
between the need to protect official secret, on the one hand, and the obligations of the State to protect 
individual persons from the illegal acts committed by their public agents and to investigate, try, and 
punish those responsible for said acts, on the other hand. [...] To solve this tension, it is necessary to take 
into account the higher interests of justice and therefore the right to the truth”. 
102
 IAComHR, Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdámez (El Salvador), Case 11.481 (Apr. 13, 
2000), para. 357. 
103
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Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
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2, 1993), para. 131; UN Commission on Human Rights, Question of Impunity of Perpetrators of Human 
Rights Violations (Civil and Political Rights) cit. 
104
 IAComHR, Alfonso René Chanfeau Oraycem (Chile) cit., para. 93. 
105
 IACtHR, Case of 19 Tradesmen v. Colombia, Judgment (July 5, 2004), para. 261; Case of Carpio 
Nicolle et al. v. Guatemala, Judgment (Nov. 22, 2004), para. 128; Case of Myrna Mack Chang v. 
Guatemala cit., para. 274. 
106
 IAComHR, Lucio Parada Cea, Héctor Joaquín Miranda Marroquín, Fausto García Funes, Andrés 
Hernández Carpio, Jose Catalino Meléndez y Carlos Antonio Martínez (El Salvador), Case 10.480, Report 
No. 1/99 (Jan. 27, 1999) para. 151. The Commission added: “[I]t is also a private right for relatives of the 
victims, which affords a form of compensation, in particular, in cases where amnesty laws are adopted. 
Article 13 of the American Convention protects the right of access to information” (IAComHR, Ignacio 
Ellacuría, S.J.; Segundo Montes, S.J.; Armando López, S.J.; Ignacio Martin-Baró, S.J.; Joaquin López Y 
López, S.J.; Juan Ramón Moreno, S.J.; Julia Elba Ramos; and Celina Mariceth Ramos (El Salvador), 
Report No. 136/99, Case 10.488 (Dec. 22, 1999), para. 224. See  also K. Dykmann, Impunity cit., 52.  
 





: knowledge of atrocities committed is a necessary 
condition to avoid the recurrence of abuses perpetrated by promoting responsibility and 
transparency in public governance and preventing corruption and authoritarianism
108
. In 
this regard, the right to the truth is a corollary of the “duty to remember” that the State 
must respect in order to avert historical distortions and preserve the historical-cultural 
“heritage” of a people. The Inter-American Court confirmed this orientation, ascribing 
to the scope of Article 1(1) of the 1969 Convention the obligation to avoid future 
violations: “Preventive measures and those against recidivism begin by revealing and 
recognizing the atrocities of the past […].” The State must therefore preserve the 
collective memory of the atrocities committed
109
, publicly disclose the results of 
investigations
110





B. The Historical Truth and the Right to Seek and Receive Information: The IACtHR’s 
Turning Point in the Gomes Lund Case 
The Gomes Lund case originated from the appeal submitted in 1995 to the Human 
Rights Commission by the Centre for Justice and International Law (CEJIL), Human 
Rights Watch/Americas, in the name of those who disappeared in the Araguaia Guerrilla 
War (guerrilha do Araguaia) and their relatives, and Brazil’s alleged responsibility for 
the arbitrary detention, torture and enforced disappearance of 70 people (members of the 
Brazilian Communist Party and peasants of the region) as a result of operations 
conducted by the national army to eradicate guerrillas between 1972 and 1975. 
Specifically, the applicants claimed the impunity of those responsible for said acts due to 
the lack of investigation, prosecution and punishment, and the inefficiency of the 
measures adopted to respect, protect and guarantee “the right to the truth and 
information”
112
. In 2009, the Inter-American Commission decided to submit the case to 
the Court of San José, considering it an important opportunity to strengthen Inter-
American jurisprudence on amnesty laws in relation to enforced disappearances and 
extrajudicial executions, and, consequently, to the State obligation “to provide society 
                                                 
107
 IAComHR, Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdámez (El Salvador) cit., para. 148; see also 
IACtHR, Case of Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, Judgment (July 4, 2006), para. 245: “The knowledge of 
the truth in human rights violations […] is an inalienable right and an important means of reparation 
for the victim and, if applicable, for their next of kin, and it constitutes a fundamental way of learning 
the truth that allows a society to develop its own methods of reproach and deterrence”.  
108
 Amicus Curiae Submission to the IACtHR cit., para. 16. 
109
 UN Commission on Human Rights, Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of 
Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity cit., principle 3, The Duty to Preserve Memory: “A 
people’s knowledge of the history of its oppression is part of its heritage and, as such, must be ensured by 
appropriate measures in fulfilment of the State’s duty to preserve archives and other evidence concerning 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law and to facilitate knowledge of those violations. Such 
measures shall be aimed at preserving the collective memory from extinction and, in particular, at 
guarding against the development of revisionist and negationist arguments”. 
110
 IACtHR, Case of Bámaca Velásquez cit., paras. 77-78. 
111
 Human Rights Council, Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner Human Rights And 
Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General, A/HRC/12/19 (Aug. 21, 2009) 
paras. 4-31; see also Human Rights Council, Report of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the Seminar on Experiences of Archives as a Means to Guarantee the 
Right to the Truth, A/HRC/17/2 (Apr. 14, 2011). 
112
 IACtHR, Case of Gomes Lund et al. cit.,  para. 14. 
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with the truth, investigate, prosecute, and punish serious human rights violation”
113
. 
Furthermore, the Commission stressed the historical value of the case as well as the 
Court’s opportunity to affirm the incompatibility of the laws on amnesty and those on 
the confidentiality of documents with the American Convention
114
. 
Although the violations referred to events that occurred nearly twenty years before the 
appeal and Brazil had accepted the Court’s jurisdiction only for acts subsequent to 10 
December 1998, the Court rejected the exceptions to its ratione temporis jurisdiction 
due to the permanent or continuous nature of the crime of enforced disappearance. 
According to the Court, the alleged violations relating to the rights to information, to 
truth and to justice persist even after the ratification of the American Convention and 
acceptance of its jurisdiction
115
. 
The gravity of the crimes also entails the duty to investigate violations of the 
conventionally recognized rights: this is not an obligation “of means” but “of results”, 
requiring member States to take all necessary measures to seek the truth and remove the 




Provisions that permit amnesty, statutory limitations and immunity are therefore “an 
inadmissible affront to the juridical conscience of humanity”
117
 incompatible with the 
American Convention: they hinder the search for truth and the punishment of those 
responsible for gross violations of human rights (such as torture, summary, extrajudicial 
and arbitrary executions, and enforced disappearances). Such obstacles must therefore 
be removed by States, which must take the necessary measures to ensure that no one is 
deprived of the right to judicial protection and to effective remedy within the meaning of 
Articles 8 and 25 of the 1969 Convention
118
. 
                                                 
113
 Id., para. 1. 
114
 The Commission requested the Court to declare that the State is responsible for the violation of the 
rights established in Article 3 (right to juridical personality), Article 4 (right to life), Article 5 (right to 
human treatment [personal integrity]), Article 7 (right to personal liberty), Article 8 (right to a fair trial 
[judicial guarantees]), Article 13 (freedom of thought and expression) and Article 25 (right to judicial 
protection) of the American Convention on Human Rights, in relation to the obligations enshrined in 
Article 1(1) (obligation to respect rights) and Article 2 (domestic legal effects) of the same.  
115
 IACtHR, Case of Gomes Lund et al. cit., para. 17: “[T]he Court highlights […] the continuous or 
permanent nature of the enforced disappearance […] [that] commence with the deprivation of liberty of 
the person and the subsequent lack of information regarding the whereabouts, and continues until the 
whereabouts of the disappeared person are made known and the facts are ascertained. Therefore, the Court 
has jurisdiction to analyze the alleged enforced disappearances of the alleged victims as of Brazil’s 
recognition of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction”. 
116
 Id., para. 108. See also paras. 137, 138: “[T]he prohibition of enforced disappearance of persons and its 
related obligation to investigate and punish those responsible have, for much time now, reached a nature 
of jus cogens. […] This investigation must be carried out in all of the available legal venues and be aimed 
at determining the truth”. 
117
 IACtHR, Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, (Mar. 14, 2001), Concurring Opinion of 
Judge A.A. Cançado-Trindade, para. 26: “No State can be considered to rest above the Law, whose norms 
have as ultimate addressees the human beings. […] It should be stated and restated firmly, whenever 
necessary that in the domain of the International Law of Human Rights, the so-called ‘laws’ of self-
amnesty are not truly laws: they are nothing but an aberration, an inadmissible affront to the juridical 
conscience of humanity.”  
118
 IACtHR, Case of Gomes Lund et al. cit., para. 173: “In a case such as the present, once the American 
Convention has been ratified, it corresponds to the State to adopt all the measures to revoke the legal 
provisions that may contradict said treaty […], such as those that prevent the investigation of serious 
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As for the legal basis of the “right to know the truth”, according to the Court, in the case 
of serious violations of human rights, the right to information enshrined in Article 13 of 
the American Convention limits the margin of State discretion in adopting exemptions 
or restrictions to the rights conventionally guaranteed and the obligation of public 
powers to act in good faith and diligently assure the effectiveness of this right
119
.  
In particular, in the case of jus cogens crimes, such as enforced disappearances and 
extrajudicial executions, the national authorities cannot resort to mechanisms such as 
official secrecy, confidentiality of information, reasons of public interest or national 
security to refuse to supply the information required by the judicial or administrative 
authorities in charge of the ongoing investigation or pending procedures. The decision to 
classify information as secret or refusing to disclose it cannot be left to the exclusive 
evaluation of a State organ whose members are accused of committing the alleged 
violations nor does that organ have discretionary responsibility for the final decision on 
the existence of the required documentation
120
. 
The right to freedom of thought and expression codified in Article 13 of the American 
Convention thus encompasses, in addition to an individual dimension (the right of 
everyone to freely express their ideas), a “social” component, i.e., the collective right to 
access information
121
. Ensuring the full and effective exercise of this right, especially 
when the right to the truth about serious violations of human rights is at stake, requires 
that State legislation and procedures be governed by the principles of good faith and 
maximum disclosure, so that all information is presumed public, accessible and subject 
to a limited regime of exceptions. Similarly, the denial of information must be justified 
and founded, and the burden of proof is on the State to prove the impossibility of 
presenting the requested information
122
. 
Pursuant to its jurisprudence, the Court also stressed that the continued denial of the 
truth on the fate of a missing person is a form of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
for family members
123
 and that determining the place of death allows the immediate 
family “to heal from the anguish and suffering caused by uncertainty of the location of 
their disappeared family member”
124
. In this context, the right of the relatives of victims 
of serious violations of human rights to know the truth of their fate constitutes a measure 
of reparation and therefore an expectation “for the next of kin and society as a whole” 
that the State must satisfy
125
. 
More specifically, the right to know the truth creates a legitimate expectation for the 
victims and requires States to organize the government apparatus (and, in general, all the 
                                                                                                                                                
human rights violations given that it leads to the defenselessness of victims and the perpetuation of 
impunity and prevent the next of kin from knowing the truth”. 
119
 Id., para. 211. 
120
 Id., para. 202. 
121
 Id., para. 197. See also IACtHR, Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo Bustos et al.) v. 
Chile, Judgment (Feb. 5, 2001), para. 67. 
122
 IACtHR, Case of Gomes Lund et al. cit., para. 230. 
123
 IACtHR, Case of Bámaca Velásquez cit., paras. 160, 165; similarly, see ECtHR, Case of Kurt cit., 
para. 131; and United Nations Human Rights Committee, Quinteros v. Uruguay Communication No. 
107/198, Decision (July 21, 1983). 
124
 IACtHR, Case of Gomes Lund et al. cit., para. 240. 
125
 See, inter alia, IACtHR, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez cit., para. 181; IACtHR, Case of Contreras et al. 
v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment (Aug. 31, 2011), para. 170; IACtHR, Case of Las 
Palmeras v. Colombia, Reparations and Costs, Judgment (Nov. 26, 2002). 
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structures through which public authority is exercised) to juridically ensure the free and 




5.- The Human Rights Courts’ Insights on the Right to the Truth in a Comparative 
Perspective: The Procedural and Substantial Yardsticks to Honour the Conscience 
of Humanity 
 
Over the last few decades, the right to the truth has increasingly come to the attention of 
international scholars and jurisprudence.  
In the Juan Méndez reconstruction, the “right to the truth” is characterized as an 
“emerging principle” in international jurisprudence given that it has not been clearly and 
indisputably codified in an international treaty
127
. The study conducted by the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights concluded that the main content of the right to the 
truth has become sufficiently delineated and includes the right to know the “full and 
complete” truth about the events that occurred, their specific circumstances, those who 
took part, the conditions in which the violations occurred and their causes. In cases of 
enforced disappearances and related abuses, the right to the truth also includes the 
special dimension of knowing the fate of the “direct” victim
128
.  
In the European and Inter-American Courts’ case-law, the abuses examined in the 
context of the right to the truth emerge as a “combination” of different violations of 
conventionally protected rights
129
. These are perceptible on both an individual and 
collective level, and often involve damage to the procedural and substantive aspects of 
the right to life, the right of the next of kin of victims to not suffer inhuman treatment 
due to prolonged pain caused by the lack of news about their loved ones, the right to 
freedom and security, and the social right to information
130
. 
Nevertheless, the nature and constitutive elements of the right to the truth have not been 
consistently interpreted by the two Human Rights Courts and certain aspects are in 
progressive evolution
131
. The ECtHR’s “timid allusion”
132
 in the El-Masri case ascribing 
the right to the truth in the context of procedural violations of ECHR Article 3 would not 
seem to be in line with the more incisive and courageous pronunciations of Inter-
American jurisprudence on the “autonomy” of this right with respect to those 
conventionally guaranteed and its collective dimension as an expression of the principle 
of democracy. 
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 IACtHR, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez cit., para. 166. 
127
 Méndez, The Right cit. 255. 
128
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Study on the Right to the Truth 
cit., para. 59. 
129
 Pasqualucci, The Whole cit. 334. 
130
 ECtHR, Case of Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia, Applications Nos. 2944/06 and 8300/07, 50184/07, 
332/08, 42509/10, Judgment (Dec. 18, 2012) para. 64. ECtHR refers to the “constant” case-law of 
IACtHR; see A. A. Cançado Trindade, Contemporary International Tribunals: Their Continuing 
Jurisprudential Cross-Fertilization Pertaining to Human Rights Protection, in The Global Community 
Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence 13.I (2013) 158. 
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 Y. Naqvi, The Right to the Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction?, in International Review of the 
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Keller, para. 10. 
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The Strasbourg judges themselves did not take unequivocal positions in ruling on the 
right to the truth. The majority’s prudence in the El-Masri case was not supported, for 
example, by Judges Tulkens, Spielmann, Sicilianos and Keller, who would have 
preferred its more explicit admittance within the framework of ECHR Article 13 “which 
includes a right of access to relevant information about alleged violations, both for the 
persons concerned and for the general public”.
133
 According to the four Judges, the 
search for the truth is the objective purpose of the duty to investigate and the raison 
d’être of the requirements of adequate and effective investigations: transparency, 
diligence, independence, access to results, their dissemination and control over these. 
For society in general, the desire to search for the truth helps strengthen trust in 
institutions and the rule of law, breaking “the wall of silence and the cloak of secrecy” 
that impede people from “making any sense of what they have experienced and are the 
greatest obstacles to their recovery”
134
. In this perspective, explicit recognition of the 
right to the truth in the context of ECHR Article 13, far from being superfluous or 
innovative, would have shed “renewed light on a well-established reality”
135
. 
The ECtHR’s approach also gave rise to concerns for Judges Casadevall and López 
Guerra, who instead considered “redundant” a separate analysis on the existence of the 
right to the truth as “something different from, or additional to, the requisites already 
established in such matters by the previous case-law of the Court”
136
. The (individual) 
right to the truth is thus equivalent to the right to an effective investigation guaranteed 
by the Court’s jurisprudence in the case of alleged violations of the right to life and the 
prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. According to Judges 
Casadevall and López Guerra, the victim (and not society) is entitled to the right to the 
truth: the adequate and effective investigation required of States in cases of mistreatment 
or other serious violations of human rights “amounts to finding out the truth of the 




The Polish cases and subsequent case-law would seem to confirm - more explicitly and 
without any separate opinions on the point - positioning the right to truth within the 
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 Id., para. 4. 
134
 Id., para. 6.  
135
 Id., para. 7. 
136
 ECtHR, Case of El-Masri cit., Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Casadevall and López Guerra. 
137
 Id. According to some scholars, the positions articulated in the aforementioned concurring opinions 
signal the ECtHR’s attempt to adopt an intermediate solution: while not succeeding in fully embracing the 
interpretation of the right to the truth under ECHR Article 13, it opens up the possibility that the duty to 
investigate violations of human rights under Article 3 of the ECHR may remedy the individual as well as 
the social damage. See F. Fabbrini, The European Court of Human Rights, Extraordinary Renditions and 
the Right to the Truth: Ensuring Accountability for Gross Human Rights Violations Committed in the 
Fight Against Terrorism, in Human Rights Law Review 14.1 (2013) 21. 
138
 ECtHR, Affaire Nasr and Ghali c. Italy, Requête n. 44883/09, Arret (23 février 2016), para. 262:” La 
Cour rappelle que, lorsqu’un individu soutient de manière défendable avoir subi, aux mains de la police ou 
d’autres services comparables de l’État, ou en conséquence d’actes commis par des agents étrangers 
opérant avec l’acquiescence ou la connivence de l’État, un traitement contraire à l’article 3, cette 
disposition, combinée avec le devoir général imposé à l’État par l’article 1 de la Convention de [...] 
requiert, par implication, qu’il y ait une enquête officielle effective. Cette enquête doit pouvoir mener à 
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As for the previous decisions concerning the right to the truth, also in the more recent 
2014 cases, the seriousness of the violations determined by the ECtHR restricts the 
discretion of the respondent State in evidentiary matters, excluding exceptions to the 




In addition, the 2014 ECtHR jurisprudence on the right to the truth is particularly 
remarkable in providing some innovative insights.  
Indeed, the 2014 rulings link the right to the truth to the Court’s judicial functions and 
thereby indicate the “general” interest in knowing what happened. Notably, “[t]he 
specificity of [ECtHR’s] task [...] to ensure the observance by the Contracting States of 
their engagement to secure the fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention - 
conditions its approach to the issues of evidence and proof”
140
. Thus, the fact that 
investigations on gross human rights abuses may involve national security does not give 
domestic authorities complete discretion in refusing to disclose evidentiary material “to 
the victim or the public” nor do the domestic regulations on the secrecy of the 
investigation constitute a legal barrier to discharging the States’ obligation to furnish 
evidence. According to the ECtHR in the 2014 Al Nashiri and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) 
cases, in failing to submit information in its possession, the respondent State obstructed 
the ECtHR in the “objective” establishment of the truth and hindered the Court’s tasks 
under Article 38 of the Convention
141
. 
Furthermore, the 2014 Polish findings on the right to know what happened in relation to 
universally condemned offences (torture, mistreatment, forced disappearances) also 
highlight - more explicitly than the El-Masri judgment - the expansion of the ECtHR’s 
jurisdiction to third States. Notably, the European Court had to necessarily rule on the 
lawfulness of the conduct of the US (not party to the ECHR) as a prerequisite to 
deciding on Poland’s responsibility
142
. The large scale and severity of the human rights 
violations, but also the suppression or secrecy of information of these practices that the 
ECtHR ascribed to the US would thus constitute the subject matter of a judgment made 
in the absence of this State’s consent
143
.  
As for Inter-American jurisprudence, emerging much more clearly is the trend to 
interpret the right to the truth in its “social perspective” as an instrument for the 
                                                                                                                                                
l’identification et, le cas échéant, à la punition des responsables et à l’établissement de la vérité. S’il n’en 
allait pas ainsi, nonobstant son importance fondamentale, l’interdiction légale générale de la torture et des 
peines et traitements inhumains ou dégradants serait inefficace en pratique, et il serait possible dans 
certains cas à des agents de l’État de fouler aux pieds, en jouissant d’une quasi-impunité, les droits des 
personnes soumises à leur contrôle”. See also with regard to the search for the truth within the framework 
of Article 13 of ECHR, at para. 334: “[L]es requérants auraient dû être en mesure, aux fins de l’article 13, 
d’exercer des recours concrets et effectifs aptes à mener à l’identification et à la punition des responsables, 
à l’établissement de la vérité et à l’octroi d’une réparation.” 
139
 ECtHR, Case of Al Nashiri cit., para. 396; ECtHR, Case of Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) cit., para. 396.  
140
 ECtHR, Case of Al Nashiri cit., para. 394; ECtHR, Case of Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) cit., para. 394.  
141
 ECtHR, Case of Al Nashiri cit., paras. 376, 494; ECtHR, Case of Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) cit., paras. 
369, 488 
142
 Id., para. 442: “The Court has taken due note of the fact that knowledge of the CIA rendition and secret 
detention operations and the scale of abuse to which High-Value Detainees were subjected in CIA custody 
evolved over time”. 
143
 See ICJ, Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, ICJ Reports 1954, at 32. M. Scheinin, The 
ECtHR Finds the US Guilty of Torture – As an Indispensable Third Party?, in EJIL Talk! (2014). 
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construction of democratic systems
144
. The importance of the collective dimension of the 
right to the truth was widely discussed in Judge Ramirez’s concurring opinion in the 
Bámaca Velásquez case: “[T]he so-called right to the truth covers a legitimate demand 
of society to know what has happened, generically or specifically, during a certain 
period of collective history, usually a stage dominated by authoritarianism, when the 
channels of knowledge, information and reaction characteristic of democracy are not 
operating adequately or sufficiently”
145
. 
Framing the right to the truth within the context of the right to information enshrined in 
Article 13 of the 1969 American Convention as established in the more recent Gomes 
Lund case has significantly consolidated this orientation: the “deterrent” effect of the 
right to the truth in its collective-cultural dimension becomes a prerequisite to protecting 
human rights and contributes to affirming the principle of democracy
146
. It allows a 
people to know and guard a fundamental part of its heritage (the history of its 
oppression) and the collectivity to be informed on past events to hamper the 
development of revisionist and negationist theories.  
The IACtHR case-law after the Gomes Lund rulings reaffirms the “social” intent of the 
right to the truth and underlines the State’s “peremptory obligation” to investigate jus 
cogens violations in conformity with international standards
147
. In the 2012 Río Negro 
Massacres v. Guatemala case, the IACtHR clarified, for example, that the search, 
identification, determination of cause of death and returning to the next of kin the 
remains of those found and identified “reveals an historical truth that contributes to 
closing the mourning process of the Maya Achí community of Río Negro [and] 




6.- Final Remarks: Crimina Juris Gentium, Right to the Truth, and the 
“Conscience” of Humanity 
As Judge Cançado-Trindade remarked, when human beings fall victim to ius cogens 
crimes, “humanity as a whole is likewise victimized. [...] Such crimes affect the human 
conscience […] -the universal juridical conscience,- and the aggrieved persons as well as 
humanity itself fall victim to them. […] This line of analysis developed by International 
Humanitarian Law and contemporary International Criminal Law must [...] be 
incorporated into the conceptual universe of International Human Rights Law.”  
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 IACtHR, Case of Bámaca Velásquez cit., Separate Concurring Opinion of Judge Sergio Garcia 
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and Costs, Judgment (Oct. 25, 2012), para. 317. See also IACtHR, Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. 
Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs (Sept. 4, 2012), para. 193: “The Court 
also reiterated that the effective search for the truth “is the responsibility of the State and does not depend 
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In our view, the positions of the European and Inter-American Human Rights Courts on 
the right to the truth are an important step in this direction. Indeed, their jurisprudential 
finding on this subject, albeit not entirely convergent, should be interpreted in the 
perspective of ensuring the values underlying the Conventions they are appointed to 
interpret: in calling on States to preserve the collective memory and bring the criminals 
to justice, the Strasbourg Court and the Court of San José have positioned themselves as 
the “conscience” of the whole of humanity
149
. As our comparative analysis shows, 
international decisions on the right to the truth have a) significantly contributed to 
highlighting the complex and serious nature of the alleged violations, b) materially 
strengthened the rule of law, and c) underlined the synergies between national systems 
of repression, the international system of human rights protection and international 
criminal law enforcement mechanisms
150
.  
First, the existing link between the right to the truth and gross violations of human rights 
has required the two Human Rights Courts to pronounce on the imperative nature of the 
violated norms
151
 as an expression of the fundamental values of the international 
community as a whole and thus prevailing with respect to the sovereign prerogatives of 
States. In this perspective, the “sensitivity of the matter” in question has enabled the 
ECtHR and IACtHR to examine the responsibility of respondent States i) overcoming 
the exceptions of ratione temporis jurisdiction
152
, ii) reversing the burden of proof of 
national authorities (which are required to disclose the documents necessary to establish 
the facts), and iii) reducing the margin of State discretion in adopting derogations or 
restrictions to conventionally guaranteed rights. 
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human being moved above all by the opinio juris as a manifestation of the universal juridical conscience, 
to the benefit of all human beings. By means of this conceptual development one will advance in the 
overcoming of the obstacles of the dogmas of the past and in the creation of a true international ordre 
public based upon the respect for, and observance of, human rights. Such development will contribute, 
thus, to a greater cohesion of the organized international community (the civitas maxima gentium), centred 
on the human person”. 
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Second, in ascertaining the truth, the two international Courts recognized the requisite 
objectivity and impartiality in exercising “public” functions and avoiding abuses
153
, for 
example, in balancing the different interests at stake: those of victims and society to 
know the truth about serious violations of human rights, their circumstances and those 
who took part, and those of the alleged perpetrators of the violations to comply with fair 
trial and privacy requirements. In line with this approach, the ECtHR and IACtHR have 
taken a clear and unequivocal position in respect of certain forms of unfairness that 
could amount to flagrant denial of justice, such as the admission of torture evidence. 
Information that has been obtained by such barbaric practices as torture is excluded as 




Finally, the international decisions in support of the right to the truth create a synergistic 
relationship between the systems of enforcement of human rights and the suppression of 
crimes
155
. Notably, these decisions offer States a legal path to shed light on human rights 
violations and overcome legal or de facto obstacles standing in the way of prosecuting 
those responsible for grave violations that affect society as a whole. Therefore, as a 
direct consequence of the international decisions upholding the right to the truth, some 
countries have taken significant steps in prosecuting cases of serious human rights 
violations. The Brazilian Attorney General Rodrigo Janot Monteiro de Barros, for 
example, expressly referred to the IACtHR finding in the Case of Gomes Lund, claiming 
that Amnesty Law cannot be an obstacle to investigating grave crimes. Similarly, the 
Mexican Federal Judge Fernando Silva García’s ruling on a series of mass murders in 
north-eastern Mexico that took the lives of hundreds of migrants explicitly cited the 
Gomes Lund Judgment in relation to the “interest of society” in “avoiding impunity and 
the repetition of such acts in the future”. 
To be added is that the ECtHR and IACtHR’s assessment of the inertia and/or 
inadequacy of national systems could legitimate third States to exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over criminals since, as Professor Ziccardi Capaldo explains, other States 
could act uti universi when the State “that has primary responsibility [...] is unable or 





Referring more expressly to the right to the truth, Professor Galinsoga Jordá  clarifies 
that domestic authorities could state that criminal proceedings are time-barred, crimes 
are amnestied and international criminal law is not applicable. In these situations, 
prosecution by a third State may be an adequate alternative: “If permitted by the scope 
of the principle of legality, these other jurisdictions could qualify the repression as 
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crimes under international law and directly apply the international law in force at the 
time of its commission.”
157 
 
However, the conduct of a State that does “not intend to initiate investigations or does 
not have the ability to conduct them correctly or to institute proceedings” and/or the 
“refusal or inability of the State to proceed correctly” in relation to violations that 
amount to jus cogens crimes, represents the condition of admissibility of a case before 
the International Criminal Court (ICC)
158
, which is designed to ensure accountability for 
serious crimes that deeply shock the conscience of humanity
159
. In this perspective, we 
share the opinion that the ICC, “with its innovative, restorative and victim-oriented 
features” could constitute a suitable alternative/parallel forum for the future realisation 
of the right to truth
160
 with respect to national judicial systems and international human 
rights courts.  
Primarily, the ICC Prosecutor has a “unique” role in international criminal law systems, 
mandated by the Statute “to establish the truth” and acting objectively by 
“investigat[ing] incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally”
161
. Therefore, 
when this right is to be satisfied through criminal proceedings, to properly balance the 
different interests at stake
162
, “the victims’ central interest in the search for the truth can 
only be satisfied if (i) those responsible for perpetrating the crimes for which they 
suffered harm are declared guilty; and (ii) those not responsible for such crimes are 
acquitted, so that the search for those who are criminally liable can continue”
163
. 
The ICC judicial trends confirm the synergies between the international control 
machineries of the human right to the truth and the mechanism of punishment of jus 
cogens crimes.  
In ruling on the victims’ right to the truth, ICC Judge Sylvia Steiner, for example, did 
not expressly reserve its ascertainment to international criminal mechanism. Rather, in 
the Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui case, Judge Steiner preferred “not to 
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address the question of whether or not this right, and the victims’ core interests that 
underlie it, can at times also be satisfied through mechanisms alternative to criminal 
proceedings”
164
. At the same time, she highlighted the relevant role played by the 
European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights’ case-law in the development of 
the right to the truth, understood as the determination of the facts, the identification of 
the responsible persons and the declaration of their responsibility
165
. 
Ascribing the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience to the domain 
of jus cogens and overcoming legal and juridical obstacles in assessing their grave 
violations, the international jurisprudence on the right to the truth regrets a “reductionist 
view of international law […] marked by pragmatism and ‘technicism’”
166
,  and 
confirms the “primacy of the raison d’humanité over the raison d’État”
167
.  
In this sense, in the ECtHR and IACtHR case-law preserving collective memory and 
bringing ius cogens criminals to justice, the right to the truth is emerging as a new 





Negli ultimi decenni, il diritto alla verità si è rapidamente imposto all’attenzione della 
dottrina e della giurisprudenza internazionali ancorchè la sua natura e i suoi gli elementi 
costitutivi non siano stati interpretati uniformemente dalle Corti europea ed 
interamericana dei diritti umani e siano, per certi aspetti, in progressiva evoluzione. Gli 
orientamenti delle due corti, sebbene non del tutto convergenti, vanno collocati 
nell’ottica di garantire i valori sottesi alle Convenzioni che esse sono deputate ad 
interpretare: richiamando gli Stati a preservare la memoria collettiva ed ad assicurare 
alla giustizia i criminali, la Corte di Strasburgo e la Corte di San Josè si sono poste 
infatti come «coscienza» della intera umanità. 
 
In recent decades, the right to the truth has increasingly come to the attention of 
international scholars and jurisprudence. Moving from the recognition of truth as a 
right in the international arena and exploring the reconstruction and evolution of the 
right to the truth in the international human rights courts’ case-law, the following 
analysis focuses on the ECtHR and IACtHR insights in a comparative perspective to 
conclude on the emerging trends of the Strasbourg Court and the Court of San José in 
interpreting and applying the right to the truth, thereby acting as the “conscience” of 
the whole of humanity.  
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